Klinger (1997, p.281) states, “[T]he division of police labor along administrative and political boundaries creates three basic types geographic zones in patrol work: the entire area of separate jurisdictions, patrol districts within larger jurisdictions, and individual car beats that subdivide small departments and districts of larger ones.” In other words, the basic unit of police patrol work is the patrol beat. Patrol beats are then grouped into administrative units “typically called divisions, precincts or districts” (Klinger 1997, p. 281). It is within each division, precinct or district that we find variation in the exercise of police vigor (Klinger 1997).
Klinger suggests that because there is little infectivity from other divisions, the norms concerning police vigor develop and exist independently by division within a department (Klinger 1997). This approach is isolationist in that it suggests that all areas within a particular division are somewhat similar in terms of factors that may determine what Klinger refers to as police vigor. That is to say that each division contains beats that are similar in factors such as crime rate, racial or ethnic make-up, and socio-economic status, to name just a few. (See, e.g., Bittner 1967; Wilson 1968; Goldstein 1977; Muir 1977 for discussion of factors that influence police discretion.) In reality, separation of a police jurisdiction in districts (or the grouping of patrol beats into districts) generally has little to do with coupling areas with similar characteristics. It may have more to do with geography, politics, or with trying to create districts with roughly equal crime statistics.
With this reality we find police districts which may contain high-crime areas as well as upper end socio-economic areas with only petty crime problems. A prime example is the North Patrol Division of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department. This division, covering 85 square miles, has a variety of working class neighborhoods, extreme upper class neighborhoods with million dollar (and up) homes, business districts, and even rural areas where a Sheriff’s Department would feel right at home (KCPD). Further, because of the geographical, political, etc. formation of police districts, it is not uncommon for more than one district to contain beat areas with similar characteristics. For example, a high crime rate area may be situated in two districts because a main road or highway which is the dividing line for districts happens to run right through the area.
How, then, can districts with such a wide variety of beat characteristics develop a common attitude of police vigor? According to the ideas expressed in Bittner (1967) a district wide does not seem likely. As Bittner suggests, the behaviors exhibited by police, even expected of the police, in skid-row areas would not be tolerated in more well-to-do areas. (See also, Brown 1981).
The ecological influences that affect police behavior and use of discretion that Klinger identifies (Klinger 1997) do exist. However, these ecological influences are more properly found at and influence behavior at the beat level rather than at the district level. Under such a scenario, we find officers within a district amending behavior, as necessary, when called into a different beat. An officer who normally patrols a business beat in the district will modify his or her behavior if dispatched to handle a case in an adjacent beat that has a different set of characteristics.
Accepting the beat-level ecological influence premise does not negate, in entirety, the idea that the district has a distinct approach to the overall use of police discretion. As Klinger (1997) notes, to a large extent districts are autonomous units. As such, factors such as the make-up of the district’s officers, its administrative personnel, the specific political environment in which it exists, its geography and other factors can create a more generalized approach to the use of police discretion. Nonetheless, the idea of ecology determining police vigor is best seated at the patrol beat level.
Accepting that police vigor is seated at the patrol beat level has certain implications for the development and execution of strategies such as community policing. In particular, there cannot be a one-size fits all approach to community policing at either the district or jurisdictional levels. Community policing focuses on crime control through involvement with the community (Eck and Spelman 1987; Klockars, 1988; Nowicki 1998). In some approaches it involves active problem solving as opposed to simple crime prevention or responsive approaches (Eck and Spelman 1987; Klockars, 1988; Nowicki 1998). Ideally, it seeks the involvement of an enfranchised community working with the police in seeking to identify, analyze, and resolve problems within the community – some crime related, others more in the realm of life-quality issues (See, e.g. Eck and Spelman 1987 discussion of the Newport News, S.A.R.A. approach).
Implementation and operation of a strategy such as community policing must be based on the same ecological factors that influence the use of police discretion. Since these occur at the beat level, the strategy must be targeted at the beat level. In the “perfect” beat where police vigor and police leniency are balanced, implementation and operation should be easy. This will likely be an enfranchised group that would work well with the police to solve the problems that affect their area. However, in other areas, such as a skid-row area, we find the disenfranchised of the world. As this affects police use of discretion (according to Bittner more towards the leniency side), so must our approach to the strategies be affected, perhaps requiring the police to use a more vigorous approach in getting community involvement.
Whether ecological factors more forcefully affect the use of police discretion at the district or beat level, these ecological factors likewise affect the use of strategies such as community policing. They require an individualized approach to the use of these strategies, not a single approach. Only by understanding the impact of ecological factors can we come to understand the correct approach to take.
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Brown, Michael K. 1981. Nonenforcement: Minor violations and disturbances.
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