The Rynard Law Firm

The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, in deciding upon a guiding philosophy for Ohio’s correctional system, faces a daunting task. The decision of the Department will certainly have a long-lasting effect on the future efforts of the Ohio criminal justice system to reduce and control crime throughout the State. This reduction and control of crime is the ultimate goal of adopting a guiding philosophy. As shall be discussed in this paper, the guiding philosophy that will have the most positive impact on these efforts is the theory of “rehabilitation.” While others may clamor for a different approach, the empirical evidence strongly supports rehabilitation as the guiding philosophy while negating the benefit of adopting other philosophies. In reaching the conclusions set out in this paper, an evidence-based approach has been taken. In other words, the conclusions reached are the result of the examination of research evidence, an approach advocated by MacKenzie (2000) and Latessa, et al. (2002). The use of such approach means that informed policy and practice decisions are made instead of relying on personal “gut” feelings or the conventional wisdom of the day (MacKenzie 2000).

Fortunately, the Department is not faced with a lengthy list of possible philosophies from which it must make its selection of an overall guiding philosophy. In this realm there are but five main philosophies of corrections to consider – retribution, rehabilitation, restoration or restorative justice, deterrence and incapacitation (Allen, et al. 2004; Schmalleger, 2005). While each of these certainly has points that make it a worthwhile philosophy or goal to strive for, it is only rehabilitation that will provide the best benefit for the State of Ohio and should be the guiding philosophy. In the pages that follow, each of the philosophies will be defined and described, and the empirical evidence that indicates why retribution, restorative justice, deterrence, or incapacitation should not be the guiding philosophy will be presented. More importantly, the evidence that strongly supports the use of rehabilitation as the guiding philosophy will be presented.

As indicated previously, the philosophies of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and restoration or restorative justice are not favored as the guiding philosophy for the Department. For deterrence and incapacitation, the empirical evidence shows that these philosophies are not the panacea to the problems of crime and recidivism. Restorative justice provides an interesting philosophical approach to corrections, but, as shall be seen below, it is not sufficiently broad to be seriously considered as a guiding philosophy. On the other hand, retribution is too broad an approach to be considered as the guiding philosophy.

Retribution is based on the idea that society needs to take out its revenge on the offender for violating society’s norms. Society is seeking give the defendant his or her “just desserts” for committing an offense (Cullen Module 1 Materials). The idea of retribution is based on the concept of lex talionis, the law of retaliation, which is similar to the idea of an “eye for an eye” (Seiter 2005). However, this need for society to take out its revenge and give the offender “just desserts” is not sufficient to stand alone as the guiding philosophy. First, it must be acknowledged that every punishment, from a fine, to probation, to prison, has some aspect of retribution to it. This makes retribution such a broad concept that it could not be a good fit for our ultimate goal. More importantly, as Cullen (Module 1 Materials, pg. 7) points out, “’ [G]etting even,’ while perhaps balancing the scales of justice, is unrelated to the goal of reducing crime and of making communities safer. Offenders are punished as an end in and of itself – to achieve justice.” Simply put, society getting back at the offender does nothing towards the goal of reducing and controlling crime. As such it is not acceptable as the Department’s guiding philosophy.

According to Braithwaite (1998, pg. 328), “Restorative justice means restoring victims, a more victim-centered criminal justice system, as well restoring offenders and restoring community.” In other words, it seeks to make the victim, offender, and community whole again after the criminal act. In restoring the victim restorative justice make work to restore property loss, injury, sense of security, dignity, and harmony (Braithwaite 1998). Restorative justice is touted and praised for its efforts at working towards accountability on the part of the offender and the efforts of the offender to restore victims and the community to the position they were at prior to the crime (Braithwaite 1998; Braithwaite 2002; Levrant, et al. 1999).

Levrant, et al. (1999, pg. 22) point out, however, “[A] fundamental weakness of restorative justice is its failure to provide a plausible blueprint for how to control crime.” In addition, “restorative justice provides few answers for how to deal with serious and persistent offenders. It is especially disturbing that advocates of restorative justice have ignored the research on the behavioral change of offenders in favor of hope … that interludes of public shaming will change deeply rooted criminal predispositions” (Levrant, et al. 1999, p. 22).

As with retribution, the fact that restorative justice does not really address the highly important goal of reducing crime and recidivism means that it should not be the Department’s guiding philosophy. That it does not satisfactorily address serious and persistent offenders makes it all the more imperative that the Department not adopt restorative justice as the guiding correctional philosophy.

Deterrence is founded on the theory that individuals make rational choices when they choose to commit crimes (Cullen, Pratt, et al. 2002). According to this theory an individual, when faced with any decision, will examine the various options available and the potential consequences of each of these options. The individual will then select the response to the situation that will maximize pleasure or reward while minimizing pain or other negative consequence (Reynolds 1997).

In the realm of the criminal justice system, the evaluation of the consequences does not stop when the potential offender identifies that one potential consequence is arrest and a criminal punishment. Instead, the potential offender also weighs the likelihood of being caught (certainty of punishment) and the most likely punishment (severity of punishment) that will occur if convicted (Cullen, Pratt, et al. 2002; Reynolds 1997). This theory holds that if the individual calculates that the likelihood of being caught and / or the probable punishment are unacceptable risks, then the individual will be deterred from committing the crime. If, however, it is unlikely that the individual will be caught or receive a significant punishment, then there is no deterrence and the crime may be committed. It should be noted, however, that when there is a low level of certainty of punishment, the severity of punishment never comes into the consideration (Cullen Chapter 2 Materials).

Deterrence, then, is the concept that criminal activity can be controlled by creating an environment where the individual will not commit a crime because the perceived likelihood of significant punishment are such as to make the choice of committing the crime too painful or unacceptable. “Deterrence is said to occur when people do not commit crimes because they fear the costs or unpleasant consequences that will be imposed upon them” (Cullen Module 2 Materials, pg. 7).

Deterrence, as a whole, is not effective . Certainly, some people choose not to commit a criminal act or another criminal act because of the fear of punishment. But, to follow the underlying theory of deterrence, deterrent effect is highly individualized, based on the individual’s perception of outcome.

Reynolds (1997) using data for a period of years from Texas only came to the conclusion that rising incarceration rates together with longer sentences created a deterrent effect that resulted in a reduction of the crime rate in Texas throughout the same period. Reynolds posited that the reduction in crime was related to the “fact” that it was more likely that an offender would receive a significant prison sentence and this deterred many people from committing crimes. Nonetheless, in Reynolds’ study (1997, pg. 137) he was forced to report, “Large numbers of Texas prisoners were released in 1991 to relieve overcrowding, and 48 percent were reincarcerated within three years.” If prison had the deterrent effect Reynolds posited, there would not have been such a large rate recidivism rate.

Further, Reynolds' examination was flawed. It failed to take into account many factors that can affect the crime rate; that is to say the crime rate is not merely affected by the perception of being locked up for a significant time (Pratt, et al. 2005). Lynch (1999, pg. 164) relates, “[I]t appears as if crime is driven by factors outside of the association that we normally make between crime and punishment. If the offender does not view it likely that he / she will be caught, the fact that there is a lengthy prison sentence does not even come into play. More importantly, an individual might choose to commit a criminal act based on many factors, not just whether prison is likely. Socioeconomic situation, culture, and peer associations are just a few of these other factors (Pratt, et al. 2005).

Lynch (1999) came to the opposite conclusion, finding that incarceration did not affect crime rates – incarceration did not deter crime. Lynch (1999, pg. 164) concluded, “An examination of the incarceration and crime data from 1972-1993 reveals no evidence of deterrence at the aggregate level for the U.S. Additional analysis of cross-sectional crime and punishment trends for 1980 through 1991 also failed to provide any basic support for the deterrence hypothesis.” A number of other researchers have come to the conclusion that deterrence is not a strong punishment goal. Gendreau, et al. (2000), Cullen et al. (1996) and Petersilia, et al. (1992) independently came to the conclusion that deterrence as exercised through community-based programs, such as ISPs, home confinement / electronic monitoring, drug testing, and boot camps was not effective.

Because deterrence, whether it be by way of incarceration or through community-based programs, does not work to reduce crime or recidivism, it is an inappropriate guiding correctional philosophy for the Department.

Incapacitation as a correctional theory flows from the idea that we can make it physically impossible for an offender to commit a crime (Seiter 2005). Incapacitation is primarily accomplished through incarceration in prison or jail. Home confinement is a form of incapacitation in the area of community-based corrections. The ultimate form of incapacitation is the death penalty. Visher (1987, pg. 514) defines incapacitation, “Incapacitation as a strategy for crime control involves the physical isolation of an offender from the community, usually through imprisonment, to prevent the offender from committing further crimes.”

Incapacitation usually takes one of two approaches – collective incapacitation or selective incapacitation. Collective incapacitation involves incapacitating all people who fit into a particular group (“collective”) (Visher 1987). Selective incapacitation on the other hand, seeks to identify those offenders whose incapacitation would best serve society. Visher (1987, pg. 515) states, “Selective incapacitation is an attempt to improve the efficiency of imprisonment as a crime control strategy by tailoring sentencing decisions to individual offenders.” Under this scheme, then, those who are likely to reoffend are incapacitated while those who are unlikely to offend are not. Selective incapacitation is a particularly attractive approach, it we can identify the 18% of the offenders who commit the majority of the crimes (Wolfgang, et al. 1972).

The extent to which incapacitation is effective is one which is highly debated. The debate revolves around the manner in which the researcher calculates incapacitation effect – “the reduction of crime that can be attributed to imprisonment” (Visher 1997, pg 514). As with many statistical studies, the decision to use an average (mean) score or the median score can have a significant difference in results. For example, DiIulio & Piehl (1991), using a self-reporting study, found the average number of non-drug related crimes committed by an offender was 141, while the median score was 12 (DiIulio & Piehl (1991), Table 1, pg. 32). Obviously using the mean score of 141 is going to result in a much higher perceived savings than the median score. Nonetheless, DiIulio & Piehl (1991 pg. 35) conclude, “We cannot currently claim that prison either pays or does not pay at the margins.” In a macro-level study, Spelman (2000, pg. 484) came to the conclusion that “Policy makers looking for a single, best estimate are in error. We will never know enough about the relationship between prisons and crime to reduce our knowledge to a single point.” Spelman did, however, indicate from his macro-level study that the prison-crime reduction link was relatively small. “A 1 percent increase in prison population … would reduce the aggregate Index Crime rate by between 0.16 and 0.31 percent” (Spelman 2000, pg 481). As Cullen (Module 3 Materials) points out, doubling the current prison population would, at best, reduce the crime rate by slightly less than one-third.

Given the minimal incarceration effect, as noted by Spelman (2000), it cannot be said that mass incarceration works at significantly reducing crime. Adopting a guiding philosophy that does not work to significantly reduce crime does not make sense and incapacitation must be rejected as the Department’s guiding philosophy. Further, as Petersilia (1992, pg. 33) states, “[E]very additional prison guard may mean one less teacher, and every prison cell constructed may mean a gang-prevention program unfounded….”

Having found the correctional philosophies of retribution, restorative justice, deterrence and incapacity to be wanting only the philosophy of rehabilitation is left. However, it is not by the process of elimination that we reach this decision. Instead, the empirical evidence, despite a long held conventional wisdom, shows that rehabilitation is effective a reducing crime and recidivism.

The use of rehabilitation as one of the main goals or philosophies of corrections is far from a new idea (See, e.g., Wines (1871); Cullen, et al. 1982a). In fact, Wines (1871) shows that at the very beginning of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in 1870 (ultimately to become the American Corrections Association) the idea of rehabilitation was shown considerable commitment from these first professional correctional administrators. Cullen and Gendreau (2000, p. 112) state that rehabilitation definitions generally revolve around three ideas:

The article effectively played into the hands of many who were seeking to move away from the medical model (Cullen, at al. 1982b; Cullen 2002). For example, public officials were faced with the cost of these treatment programs. It was simply much less expensive to warehouse the prisoners. In addition, prisoners, the ACLU, and some criminologists objected to forced rehabilitation, and complained about the inability to effectively match prisoner needs to the correct treatment programs and the great amount of subjectivity involved -- from the filling of available slots in programs to how the parole board weighed the participation in rehabilitative programs (Cullen, at al. 1982b). Psychologists complained that the criminogenic environment of prison life had a negative impact on the ability of the programs to be effective. There were also the dramatic stories in the media of offenders who had engaged in heinous crimes while on parole and other media reports of prisoners living the life of luxury inside the walls of the prisons (Cullen, at al. 1982b).

In the wake of the Martinson (1974) study, a number of researchers have reevaluated the findings of Martinson. Research conducted by Palmer (1975) found that 48% of 83 studies evaluated showed reductions in recidivism. Similarly, a study of well-controlled evaluations of correctional treatment services conducted by Andrews et al. (1990), showed positive recidivism rates in at least 40% of the programs studied. A meta-analysis by Lipsey and Wilson (1993) indicated a positive effect size for all of the programs evaluated (Cullen and Gendreau 2000; see also Lipsey 1999). Probably the most wide-ranging assessment was reported by Losel (1995) who found that the average effect size was between .05 and .18. According to Cullen and Gendreau (2000, p. 137), “Losel estimates that across all the meta-analyses, ‘the mean effects size of all assessed studies probably has a size of about 0.10’ (p. 89).” Even Martinson, whose “nothing works” essay later changed his view about rehabilitation programs. Martinson (1979, p. 254) reported, “On the basis of the evidence in our current study, I withdraw this conclusion [that nothing works]. I have often said that treatment added to the networks of criminal justice is ‘impotent’ … the conclusion is not correct” (as quoted in Cullen and Gendreau 2000, p 133).

A number of rehabilitation programs have been found to be ineffective in reducing recidivism. Deterrence-based programs (Andrews et al. 1990; Lipsey and Wilson 1998), casework and group or individual counseling (Losel 1995), control-oriented programs such as boot camps (Cullen and Gendreau 2000) and Intensive Supervision (ISP) (Petersilla and Turner 1993; Gendreau et al. 2000) were all shown to be ineffective in reducing recidivism. In some cases there was even an increase in recidivism (see, e.g., Andrews et al. 1990; Andrews and Bonta 1998). According to Losel (1995, p. 91), “it is mostly cognitive-behavioural, skill-oriented and multi-modal programmes that yield the best effects.” (See also, Gendreau 2000.) Cullen and Gendreau (2000 p. 145-148) set out four guiding principles for effective programs: (1) the program should target “known predictors of crime and recidivism for change.” These are the dynamic predictors or “criminogenic needs” and include antisocial / procriminal attitudes, values, and beliefs, procriminal associates, impulsiveness, risk-taking, and low self-control (Andrews 1995); (2) the treatment program should be behavioral in nature, with the most common form of treatment being the cognitive-behavioral programs that attempt to adjust the distorted (wrong) cognitions and teach new cognitive skills.; (3) treatment programs should be used for high-risk offenders and target their criminogenic needs.; (4) other considerations such as community treatment (as opposed to in-prison treatment), well-trained staff, and after-care all increase treatment effectiveness.

Cullen, Fisher et al. (2000) note that the American public is basically “punitive” in nature, that is to say, they want those who commit offenses to be punished. Yet, despite all the rhetoric of the “tough on crime” chest-beating, the public does in fact support rehabilitation. Cullen (1996) found that, in Ohio, 41.1% of those in the study selected rehabilitation as the main emphasis of prison compared to only 20.3% saying that retribution should be the main emphasis. In a national study 55% selected rehabilitation as the main goal (Cullen, Pealer, et al. 2002). It was also found that 87% viewed rehabilitation as important or very important in the prison setting (Cullen, Pealer, et al. 2002). When polled about the importance of rehabilitation, regardless of whether the offender was incarcerated (e.g. in community-based corrections programs), these numbers rise to 80% in the Ohio research, and 92% in the national survey (Cullen, Fisher, et al. 2000; Cullen, Pealer, et al. 2002). And when it comes to juveniles, the American public is particularly interested in programs that will intervene early in their lives in order to guide them along a prosocial path before they become serious adolescent and adult offenders (See, e.g., Farrington 1994; Henggeler 1997; Loeber 2003).

We know: Rehabilitation programs work at reducing recidivism, particularly cognitive-behavioral and criminogenic needs based programs; Programs cited as rehabilitative in nature, such as boot camps, ISP, and casework and group or individual counseling are not effective; and, There is strong public support for rehabilitation, with as much as 92% of those surveyed finding rehabilitation an important goal regardless of whether the offender is incarcerated. Given the facts rehabilitation is ideal as the guiding correctional philosophy of the Department.

When taken together, the empirical evidence is clear that the guiding philosophy of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction must be rehabilitation. The philosophy will meet the overarching goal of reducing crime by reducing recidivism. Those who commit offenses against the people (society) of Ohio will be returned to society with a real opportunity to make contributions to that society and without committing further crimes.





REFERENCES

Allen, H., Simonsen, C., & Latessa, E. (2004). Corrections in America: An Introduction. 10th ed. Upper Saddle River, NY: Prentice Hall.

Andrews, D. A. 1995. "The Psychology of Criminal Conduct and Effective Treatment." Pp. 35-62 in J. McGuire (ed.), What Works: Reducing Reoffending—Guidelines from Research and Practice. New York: John Wiley.

Braithwaite, J. 1998. "Restorative Justice." Pp. 323-344 in M. Tonry (ed.), The Handbook of Crime and Punishment. New York: Oxford University Press.

Braithwaite, J. 2002. “Does Restorative Justice Work?” Pp. 45-71 in (Braithwaite’s) Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cullen, F.T. (n.d.). Module 1 Materials: Crisis in Corrections.

Cullen, F.T. (n.d.). Module 2 Materials: The Effectiveness of Deterrence.

Cullen, F.T. (n.d.). Module 3 Materials: The Effectiveness of Incapacitation.

Cullen, F.T. (n.d.). Module 4 Materials: The Effectiveness of Rehabilitation.

Cullen, F.T. (n.d.). Module 5 Materials: Three Contemporary Correctional Issues.

Cullen, F. T. 2002. “Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs.” Pp. 253-259 [references pp. 606-614] in J. Q. Wilson and J. Petersilia (eds.), Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Cullen, Francis T., John E. Eck, and Christopher T. Lowenkamp. 2002. “Environmental Corrections: A New Paradigm for Effective Probation and Parole Supervision.” Federal Probation 66 (September):28-37.

Cullen, F. T., B. S., Fisher, and B. K. Applegate. 2000. “Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections.” Pp. 1-79 in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cullen, F. T. and P. Gendreau. 2000. “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects.” Pp. 109-175 in J. Horney (ed.), Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Cullen, F. T. and K. E. Gilbert. (1982a). “The Rise of Rehabilitation.” Chapter 3 in Reaffirming Rehabilitation. Cincinnati: Anderson.

Cullen, F. T. and K. E. Gilbert. (1982b). “Attacking Rehabilitation.” Chapter 4 in Reaffirming Rehabilitation. Cincinnati: Anderson.

Cullen, F. T., J. A. Pealer, B. S. Fisher, B. K. Applegate, and S. A. Santana. 2002. “Public Support for Correctional Rehabilitation in America: Change or Consistency?” Pp. 128-147 in J. Roberts and M. Hough (eds.), Changing Attitudes to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and Justice. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.

Cullen, F. T., T. C. Pratt, S. L. Miceli, and M. M. Moon. (2002). “Dangerous Liaison? Rational Choice Theory as a Basis for Correctional Intervention.” Pp. 279-296 in A. R. Piquero and S. G. Tibbetts (eds.), Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior. New York: Taylor and Francis Books.

Cullen, F. T., J. P. Wright, and B. K. Applegate. 1996. “Control in the Community: The Limits of Reform?” Pp. 69-116 in A. T. Harland (ed.), Choosing Correctional Interventions That Work: Defining the Demand and Evaluating the Supply. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

DiIulio, J. J., Jr. and A. M. Piehl. 1991. “Does Prison Pay?” The Brookings Review 9 (Fall):28-35.

Farrington, D. P. 1994. "Early Developmental Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency." Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 4:209-227.

Gendreau, P. 1996. "The Principles of Effective Intervention with Offenders." Pp. 117-130 in A. T. Harland (ed.), Choosing Correctional Interventions That Work: Defining the Demand and Evaluating the Supply. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Gendreau, P., C. Goggin, F. T. Cullen, and D. A. Andrews. 2000. “The Effects of Community Sanctions and Incarceration on Recidivism.” Forum on Corrections Research 12 (May):10-13.

Henggeler, S. W. 1997. Treating Serious Anti-Social Behavior in Youth: The MST Approach. Washington, DC: OJJDP, U.S. Department of Justice.

Latessa, E. J., F. T. Cullen, and P. Gendreau. 2002. “Beyond Correctional Quackery: Professionalism and the Possibility of Effective Treatment.” Federal Probation 66 (September):43-49.

Levrant, S., Cullen, F.T., Fulton, B. and Wozniak, J.F.. 1999. "Reconsidering Restorative Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited?" Crime and Delinquency 45:3-27.

Lipsey, M. 1999. “Can Intervention Rehabilitate Serious Delinquents?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 564 (July):142-166.

Lipsey, M.W. and Wilson, D.B. (1993). The efficacy of psychological, educational, and behavioral treatment. American Psychologist 48(12): 1181-1209.

Loeber, R., D. P. Farrington, and D. Petechuk. 2003. Child Delinquency: Early Intervention and Prevention. Washington, DC: OJJDP, U.S. Department of Justice.

Losel, F. (1995). The efficacy of correctional treatment: A review and synthesis of meta-evaluations. In What Works: Reducing Reoffending, edited by James McGuire. West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Lynch, M. J. 1999. “Beating a Dead Horse: Is There Any Basic Empirical Evidence for the Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment?” Crime, Law and Social Change 31: 347-362.

MacKenzie, D. L. 2000. “Evidence-Based Corrections: Identifying What Works.” Crime and Delinquency 46:457-471.

Martinson, R. 1974. “What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform.” The Public Interest 35 (Spring):22-54.

Martinson, R. (1979). New findings, new views: A note of caution regarding sentencing reform. Hofstra Law Review 7 (Winter): 243-258.

Nagin, D. S. 1998. "Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century." Pp. 1-42 in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Volume 23. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Palmer, T. (1975). “Martinson Revisited.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 12 (July): 133-152.

Petersilia, J. 1992. “California’s Prison Policy: Causes, Costs, and Consequences.” The Prison Journal 72:8-36.

Petersilia, J. and S. Turner. 1993. “Intensive Probation and Parole.” Pp. 281-335 in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Volume 17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pratt, T.C. and F.T. Cullen. 2005. “Assessing Macro-level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis.” Pp. 373-450 in M. Tonry (ed.) Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reynolds, M. O. 1997. Crime and Punishment in America: 1997 Update. Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis.

Schmalleger, F. (2005). Criminal Justice Today. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NY: Prentice Hall.

Seiter, R.P. (2005). Corrections: An Introduction. Upper Saddle River, NY: Prentice Hall.

Spelman, W. 2000. “What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime.” Pp. 419-494 in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Visher, C. A. 1987. “Incapacitation and Crime Control: Does a ‘Lock ‘Em Up’ Strategy Reduce Crime”? Justice Quarterly 4:413-543.

Wines, E. C. (ed.). 1871. “Declaration of Principles Adopted and Promulgated by the Congress.” Pp. 541-548 in Transactions of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline. Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons.

Wolfgang, M., R. Figlio, and T. Sellin. (1972). Delinquency in a Birth Cohort. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.